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Abstract
In the context of monopolistic nonlinear pricing, we compare the maximum
prots of bundling, incremental discounts, and all-units discounts. When the
number of pricing blocks is unrestricted, incremental discounts perform weakly
the worst. However, if the performance of incremental discounts is not strictly
worse when the number of blocks is unrestricted, then it performs the best when
the number of blocks is restricted. It is because incremental discounts have
the smallest "implementation power" and the largest "approximation power."
These results are applications of our general theory of menu implementability,
which characterizes the set of outcomes implementable by a menu of tari¤
options, where the set of admissible tari¤ options and the number of tari¤
options in the menu are pre-determined.
Keywords: Nonlinear pricing, Bundling, Incremental discounts, All-units
discounts, Incentive-compatible mechanisms
JEL Classication Numbers: D42, D82, D86, L12.
1 Introduction
We revisit Maskin and Riley (1984) monopolistic nonlinear pricing problem, in which
a monopolist faces heterogeneous consumers with one-dimensional continuous types,
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Figure 1: Bundle (left), Incremental discounts (middle) and All-units discounts (right)
and the consumerstypes are private information. If the monopolist is free to adopt
any pricing scheme to maximize prot, the optimal (or second best) solution is now
well known. However, in this continuous type model, the optimal nonlinear pricing
scheme is complicated, at least far more complicated than what we observe in reality.
What if the monopolist has to use a pricing scheme that is in some "practical" form
(e.g. o¤ering a menu of two-part tari¤s)? Given a practical form, what are the
restrictions it put on the set of feasible outcomes? How should the monopolist choose
among di¤erent practical forms of pricing schemes?
To tackle these issues, we need to be more precise about what forms of pricing
schemes we consider practical. Our treatment to this has two levels. At the rst
level, the application part, we consider three forms of pricing schemes to be practical:
bundling (BD) schemes, incremental discounts (ID) schemes, and all-units discounts
(AD) schemes. These three forms are illustrated in Figure 1. Under a BD scheme,
illustrated in the left panel, only several quantities, each associated with a gross price,
are o¤ered for consumers to choose. Under an ID scheme, illustrated in the middle
panel, progressive discounts apply to incremental units when the order size exceeds
certain thresholds. We also allow a xed fee under an ID scheme.1 Under an AD
scheme, illustrated in the right panel, progressive discounts apply to all units when
the order size exceeds certain thresholds. We also allow a minimum purchase under
an AD scheme.2 In our terminology, an AD scheme does not have a xed fee; if it
does (i.e., the vertical intercept of the right panel becomes non-zero), then we call
it an all-units discounts with xed fee (ADF) scheme. Notice that the three pricing
1If one insists that ID has no xed fee, we can mimic the xed fee by letting the marginal price
huge for the very rst units.
2If one insists that AD has no minimum purchase, we can mimic the minimum purchase by letting
the per-unit price huge for the order size below the rst threshold.
2
schemes in Figure 1 have arguably the same level of complexity: each of them has
three blocks, and can be characterized by six parameters. Indeed, under any of the
three forms, a pricing scheme with n blocks requires 2n parameters to characterize.
(Of course, ADF schemes require one more parameter for the xed fee.) It then makes
much sense to ask, with the same number of blocks, which of the three forms yields
the highest prot for the monopolist.
The second level of our treatment is the general theory part. In this part we
more generally deal with principal-agent model, where the meaning of practicality is
exible, and we develop a general theory that su¢ ces to analyze any particular form
of pricing schemes, provided that it is in the "menu class" that we explain below. In
order to motivate our general theory, notice that each of the aforementioned three
forms of pricing schemes can be regarded as o¤ering a menu of simple tari¤ options
for consumers to select. O¤ering a BD scheme with n blocks (or n points here) is
equivalent to o¤ering n quantity-payment bundles. O¤ering an ID scheme with n
blocks is equivalent to o¤ering n two-part tari¤s.3 O¤ering an AD scheme with n
blocks is equivalent to o¤ering n "minimum purchase tari¤s" (see Section 3). That
makes it possible to build an elegant unifying framework to analyze all the three
forms.
In the application part (Sections 2  4), we rst characterize outcomes imple-
mentable by BD, ID and ADF schemes, given any number of blocks n (Theorems 1, 2
and 3.) Those characterizations are special cases of the results in the general theory
part. Then we derive many implications with our characterizations. First, when the
number of blocks is unrestricted, i.e., n = 1, every incentive-compatible and indi-
vidually rational outcome is implementable by BD schemes, and by ADF schemes.
On the other hand, AD schemes (without xed fee) can implement at least as many
outcomes as ID schemes do. In this sense we say that BD and ADF have the largest
and ID has the smallest "implementation power" among the three forms (Theorem
4). It follows that when the number of blocks is unrestricted, ADF can attain the
Maskin-Riley second best monopoly prot, and ID can never perform better than AD
(Corollary 2).
Second, we derive the condition under which ID or AD can attain the second best
prot, when the number of blocks is unrestricted (Corollary 3). It amounts to derive
the condition under which the Maskin-Riley second best outcome is implementable
3An ID pricing scheme with n blocks can be regarded as the lower envelope of n two-part tari¤s.
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by ID or AD schemes.
Third, if ID can attain the second best prot when the number of blocks is unre-
stricted, then it yields strictly higher prot than BD and ADF when the number of
blocks is restricted, i.e., n < 1. Proving this result is harder because, given a nite
number n of blocks, the sets of outcomes implementable by BD, ID and ADF are not
comparable (i.e., do not contain one another). However, it can be done by showing
that, under the premise and given any outcome implementable by BD or ADF scheme
with n blocks, there exists an outcome implementable by ID scheme with n blocks
that better approximate the Maskin-Riley second best solution. In this sense, we
say that ID has larger "approximation power" than BD and ADF (Theorem 5). The
variations of implementation power and approximation power are closely related to
trade-o¤s between control and exibility, which we discuss in the concluding remarks.
The general theory part (Sections 5 and 6) generally analyzes forms of pricing
schemes that can be described as a menu of tari¤ options, where the set of admissible
tari¤options C and the number of tari¤options n in the menu are pre-determined. We
introduce the concept of tari¤ single crossing property and tari¤ increasing di¤erences
to characterize the set of outcomes implementable by such a menu given the number
n and the set C (Theorems 6 8). Such outcomes are said to be menu implementable
with respect to (n; C). In general, restricting to o¤ering a menu makes the issue of
incentive compatibility more severe. Hence menu implementability is strictly stronger
than the ordinary incentive compatibility.
Our application part is related to the literature of monopolistic nonlinear pricing,
which originated with Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Maskin and Riley (1984). Few
papers are concerned with comparison among suboptimal forms of pricing schemes,
although Kolay and Sha¤er (2003) and Kolay, Sha¤er, and Ordover (2004) are ex-
ceptions. Both of these two papers assume that the monopolistic seller has constant
marginal cost and the privately informed buyers have only two types. Kolay and
Sha¤er (2003) show that the best BD scheme yields strictly higher prot than the
best ID scheme. Kolay, Sha¤er, and Ordover (2004) show that the best AD scheme
yields higher prot than the best ID scheme. While their results are in spirit consis-
tent with our Corollary 2, our analyses di¤er from theirs most signicantly in that we
assume a continuum of buyerstypes but restrict the complexity level (i.e., number
of blocks) of pricing schemes.
4
Although the use of AD in intermediate-goods markets is common,4 there is little
theoretical analysis on it in the literature, except Kolay, Sha¤er, and Ordover (2004).
Why does a seller use AD rather than ID? It has been informally argued that the use
of AD is anticompetitive or exclusionary (to exclude entry of competitors, or induce
downstream retailers to promote the products at the expense of other substitute
products).5 So one might wonder whether a monopolist without fear of competition
would nd AD superior. The implication of our results on this has two sides. First,
in principle both AD and ID could perform better for a monopolist without fear
of competition. But second, under certain conditions (which could be plausible in
certain contexts but not in others) ID must outperform AD for such a monopolist.6
Our general theory part is related to the literature of principal-agent models and
mechanism design. O¤ering simple menus as a practical scheme is relevant in other
principal-agent contexts (e.g. the ones in La¤ont and Martimort (2002)), where our
general theory of menu implementability applies equally well. We list some works
on this line. In the context of procurement contracting, Rogerson (2003) considers
"Fixed Price Cost Reimbursement (FPCR) menus", that is, two-item menus where
one item is a cost-reimbursement contract and the other item is a xed-price contract,
of which the principal allows the agent to pick one. He shows that, if the agents
utility is quadratic and the agents type is distributed uniformly, then "the optimal
FPCR menu always captures at least three-quarters of the gain that the optimal
complex menu achieves." Chu and Sappington (2007) relax the assumption of uniform
distribution, and show that a menu of two options, namely, a cost-reimbursement
contract and a linear cost sharing contract, can always secure at least 73 percent of
the gain. In the context of nonlinear pricing, Wilson (1993) claims that the loss due
to limiting the number n of two-part tari¤s is of order 1=n2. Bergemann, Shen, Xu,
and Yeh (2011) consider Mussa and Rosen (1978) quality di¤erentiation setting and
show under "linear-quadratic specication" that the loss resulting from the usage
of a nite n-class menu is of order 1=n2. Wong (2009) also considers Mussa and
Rosen (1978) setting and shows that the marginal gain of increasing the number n is
4According to Kolay, Sha¤er, and Ordover (2004), AD is used by Coca-Cola, Irish Sugar British
Airways, and Michelin.
5See, for example, Tom, Balto, and Averitt (1999).
6For example, ID must outperform AD if the conditions in the rst half of Remark 2 hold. But
AD could outperform ID under the same conditions except that marginal cost is increasing. Consider
the specication in Example 1 with 1=2 <   p2=2 and large enough n.
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diminishing, and of order 1=n3. Miravete (2007) uses a large sample of independent
cellular telephone markets to structurally estimate a monopolistic nonlinear pricing
model. His estimates suggests that "rms should only o¤er few tari¤ options if the
product development costs of designing them are non-negligible."
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 4 are the application
part. Section 2 formulates the monopolistic nonlinear pricing problem and presents
some basic facts about it. Section 3 characterizes the set of outcomes implementable
by BD, ID and ADF schemes. Section 4 compares the performances of these forms
of pricing schemes. Sections 5 6 are the general theory part. Section 5 generalizes
the model in Section 2 into one that can be adapted to many other principal-agent
settings. Section 6 presents our characterization of menu implementability. Section 7
concludes. The proofs not in the main text are in Appendix.
2 Monopolistic nonlinear pricing problem
Consider a monopolistic nonlinear pricing problem, in which each consumers utility
function is
S (q; )  t
where S : R+! R is the consumers gross utility function and t 2 R denotes the
payment from the consumer to the monopolist. The argument q denotes the quantity
consumed; the argument  denotes the consumers type (or preference parameter),
whose domain  is an interval

; 

. A consumers type is her private information.
The monopolist only knows the cumulative distribution function F of consumers
types, which has a positive density f on the support . Each consumer has an
outside option (q; t) = (0; 0), i.e., buying nothing and paying nothing.
Given q and t, the monopolists ex post (per-customer) prot is given by t  c (q),
where c : R+ ! R is the monopolists cost function. If each consumer of type  buys
quantity Q () and pays T (), then the monopolists ex ante (per-customer) prot is
Z 

[T ()  c (Q ())] dF () : (1)
Assumption 1 S and c are twice di¤erentiable. S (0; ) = 0 for all  2 . If q > 0,
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then S (q; ) > 0. Strict Spence-Mirrlees single crossing condition: Sq (q; ) > 0.7
From the revelation principle, it is without loss of generality to restrict attention
to outcomes (which can be thought of as direct revelation mechanisms) that are
incentive-compatible and individually rational. Formally, an outcome, written as
(Q; T ), is a pair of functions Q :  ! R+ and T :  ! R. Q is called the quantity
function and T the payment function of outcome (Q; T ). An outcome (Q; T ) is said
to be incentive-compatible (IC) if for any ; 0 2 , we have
S (Q () ; )  T ()  S(Q(0); )  T (0):
An outcome (Q; T ) is said to be individually rational (IR) if for any  2 , we have
U ()  S (Q () ; )  T ()  0:
Fact 1 and Fact 2 below are well known and we state them without proof for
future reference.
Fact 1 An outcome (Q; T ) is IC if and only if Q () is nondecreasing and U (2)  
U (1) =
R 2
1
S (Q (x) ; x) dx for any 1; 2 2 .
It is well known that the payment function can be rewritten using IC as
T () = S (Q () ; ) 
Z 

S (Q (x) ; x) dx  U () ; (2)
and hence the prot (1) can be rewritten as
Z 

H (Q () ; ) dF ()  U () ; (3)
where H is the "virtual surplus function" dened as
H (q; )  S (q; )  S (q; ) 1  F ()
f ()
  c (q) :
7In particular, the gross utility S is not required to be increasing or concave in quantity q. Hence,
the consumer can be for example interpreted as a down-stream retailer, and the gross utility function
as the retailers revenue function, as in e.g. Kolay, Sha¤er, and Ordover (2004).
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If an outcome (Q; T ) maximizes the monopolists prot (1) subject to IC and
IR, we say (Q; T ) is a second best outcome, Q is a second best quantity function,
and the associated prot, denoted as , is the second best prot. We assume that a
second best outcome exists.
Fact 2 The second best prot  can be written as
 = max
Q()0
( R 

H (Q () ; ) dF ()
s.t. Q () is nondecreasing
)
: (4)
An outcome (Q; T ) is second best if and only if Q () solves problem (4) and
T  () = S (Q () ; ) 
Z 

S (Q
 (x) ; x) dx: (5)
3 Bundling, incremental discounts, and all-units
discounts
If the monopolist is free to adopt any pricing scheme, then any IC and IR outcome
is implementable and hence the monopolist maximum prot is the second best prot
. This section studies the sets of implementable outcomes when the monopolist
restricts itself to adopt bundling schemes, incremental discounts schemes, or all-units
discounts schemes. The results in this and the next sections are proved (in Appendix)
after our general theory of menu implementability (Section 6) is developed.
A bundling (BD) scheme is a menu of options o¤ered by the monopolist, with
each option composed of a purchase quantity q  0 and a total payment t 2 R. Each
consumer has to pick either one option in the menu, or the outside option. We say
a BD scheme implements an outcome (Q; T ) if there is a best response of consumers
(which for each consumerstype assigns an option in the menu or the outside option
to maximize consumersutility) such that the outcome of this best response coincides
with (Q; T ). If a BD scheme has at most n options (where n 2 N [ f1g, i.e., n is a
nonnegative integer or the innity), then it is called an n-BD scheme.
Theorem 1 Take any n 2 N[f1g. An outcome (Q; T ) can be implemented by some
n-BD scheme if and only if it is IC and IR, and Q takes at most n values except 0.
8
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Figure 2: Quantity function implemented by a 3-BD scheme
If an outcome can be implemented by some n-BD scheme, we call it n-BD-
implementable. We say an outcome is BD-implementable if it is1-BD-implementable.
We turn to incremental discounts schemes. A two-part tari¤ characterized by
(p; ) 2 R+ R is a function that assigns each quantity q 2 R+ the payment pq + .
Of course, p and  are the marginal price and the xed fee of this two-part tari¤.
An incremental discounts (ID) scheme is dened as a menu of two-part tari¤s o¤ered
by the monopolist. Each consumer has to pick either a two-part tari¤ in the menu
and a purchase quantity (and hence also a payment), or the outside option. We say
an ID scheme implements an outcome (Q; T ) if there is a best response of consumers
(which for each consumerstype assigns a two-part tari¤ in the menu and a purchase
quantity or the outside option to maximize consumersutility) such that the outcome
of this best response coincides with (Q; T ). If an ID scheme has at most n two-part
tari¤s (where n 2 N [ f1g), then it is called an n-ID scheme.
Theorem 2 Take any n 2 N [ f1g. An outcome (Q; T ) can be implemented
by some n-ID scheme if and only if it is IC and IR, and for every  2 A 
f 2  : (Q () ; T ()) 6= (0; 0)g there exists some P () 2 R+ such that
1. Q () 2 argmaxq0 fS (q; )  P () qg for every  2 A,
2. P is nonincreasing, and
3. P takes at most n values.8
8Since S (; ) is assumed to be di¤erentiable, a necessary condition is that Sq (Q () ; ) is non-
increasing and takes at most n values on f 2  : Q () > 0g. In particular, it is violated when the
derivative Q0 () is too smaller at some  with Q () > 0, since we have assumed that Sq > 0.
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Figure 3: Quantity function implemented by a 3-ID scheme
(Type  consumers are meant to pick the outside option if  2 nA, and pick the
two-part tari¤ characterized by (P () ; T ()  P ()Q ()) if  2 A.)
If an outcome can be implemented by some n-ID scheme, we call it n-ID-implementable.
We say an outcome is ID-implementable if it is 1-ID-implementable.
We turn to all-units discounts schemes. A minimum purchase tari¤ characterized
by (m; p; ) 2 R+R+R is a function that assigns each quantity q  m the payment
pq + . The parameters m, p and  are called the minimum purchase, the marginal
price and the xed fee of this minimum purchase tari¤. An all-units discounts with
xed fee (ADF) scheme is dened as a menu of minimum purchase tari¤s o¤ered by
the monopolist, such that the xed fees of those minimum purchase tari¤s are the
same. Each consumer has to pick either a minimum purchase tari¤ in the menu and a
purchase quantity (and hence also a payment) that is no smaller than the associated
minimum purchase, or the outside option. We say an ADF scheme implements an
outcome (Q; T ) if there is a best response of consumers such that the outcome of this
best response coincides with (Q; T ). If an ADF scheme has zero xed fee, we simply
call it an all-units discounts (AD) scheme. If an ADF (or AD) scheme has at most
n minimum purchase tari¤s (where n 2 N [ f1g), then it is called an n-ADF (or
n-AD) scheme.
Theorem 3 Take any n 2 N [ f1g. Given  2 R, an outcome (Q; T ) can be
implemented by some n-ADF scheme with xed fee  if and only if it is IC and IR,
and for every  2 A  f 2  : (Q () ; T ()) 6= (0; 0)g there exist some M() 2 R+
and P () 2 R+ such that
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Figure 4: Quantity function implemented by a 3-ADF scheme
1. T () = P ()Q () +  for every  2 A,
2. Q () 2 argmaxqM() fS (q; )  P () qg for every  2 A,
3. M is nondecreasing and P is nonincreasing, and
4. (M;P ) takes at most n values.9
(Type  consumers are meant to pick the outside option if  2 nA, and pick the
minimum purchase tari¤ characterized by (M () ; P () ; ) if  2 A.) (If n =1, the
function M can be chosen as the restriction of Q on A.)
If an outcome can be implemented by some n-ADF (or n-AD) scheme, we call
it n-ADF-implementable (or n-AD-implementable). We say an outcome is ADF-
implementable (or AD-implementable) if it is 1-ADF-implementable (or 1-AD-
implementable).
Theorems 1 3 imply restrictions on outcomes that can be implemented by n-
BD, n-ID and n-ADF (and hence n-AD) schemes. The left panels of Figures 2 
4 illustrate how the options in the menu has to be distributed to di¤erent types;
the right panels illustrate the patterns of the associated quantity functions, where
D (p; ) denotes the demand argmaxq0 fS (q; )  pqg. The following observations
are important. Adopting an ID scheme, the induced quantity function cannot respond
to type too little, because (i) within each block (corresponding to a two-part tari¤),
9An important necessary condition is that (T ()  ) =Q () is nonincreasing and takes at most
n values on f 2  : Q () > 0g.
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the quantity function has to follow a "type-demand curve," which is increasing, and
(ii) across blocks, the relevant "type-demand curve" can only shift up, since marginal
price has to be nonincreasing in type. In contrast, adopting a BD scheme, the induced
quantity function has to be at within each block. (Of course the jumps have to be
upward by incentive compatibility.) From this viewpoint, ADF (and also AD) stands
between ID and BD. Adopting an ADF scheme, within a block, the induced quantity
function can have both a at portion when the minimum purchase is binding, and a
"type-demand curve portion" when the minimum purchase is not binding.
Comparing Figures 2 4, one might suspect that, given the number of options n
to be included in the menu, AD (even without xed fee) can implement more general
quantity functions than ID and BD can. But it is not true, because we are not totally
free to choose the combination of the minimum purchases (mis), the marginal prices
(pis) and the thresholds of AD schemes. The combination of those parameters has
to make every marginal type between two blocks indi¤erent between picking the two
minimum purchase tari¤s corresponding to the two blocks. After all, under AD we
have the same degrees of freedom, namely 2n, as ID and BD. The comparison among
the maximum prots of the three forms is studied in the next section.
4 Comparison among the three forms of pricing
schemes
For each n 2 N [ f1g, let BDn denote the maximum monopolist prot that can
be made by o¤ering some n-BD scheme. We dene IDn , 
AD
n and 
ADF
n similarly.
For these maximum prots to be well dened, we assume that corresponding optimal
outcomes (i.e., outcomes that makes the highest prot among those implementable by
the corresponding schemes) exist. Those optimal outcomes are called n-BD-optimal
outcome, n-ID-optimal outcome, etc.; and those maximum prots are called n-BD-
maximum prot, n-ID-maximum prot, etc. If n = 1, we might simply call them
BD-optimal outcome, ID-optimal outcome, BD-maximum prot, ID-maximum prot,
etc.
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4.1 Unrestricted number of options (n =1)
From Theorem 1, any BD-optimal outcome is also a second best outcome, and BD1
is also the second best prot . From Theorems 1  3 one can immediately see
that limn!1BDn = 
BD
1 = 
, limn!1IDn = 
ID
1 , limn!1
ADF
n = 
ADF
1 and
limn!1ADn = 
AD
1 .
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When the number of options in the menu is unrestricted (i.e., n =1), we can rank
the maximum prots of BD, ID, ADF and AD because we can rank the corresponding
sets of implementable outcomes. First of all, the set of outcomes implementable by
BD schemes must be the largest: when the number of quantity-payment bundles is
unrestricted, BD puts no restriction on implementable outcome except IC and IR.
In other words, any IC and IR outcome is 1-BD-implementable. It follows that
 = BD1 . The following characterizations of 1-ID-implementability and 1-AD-
implementability are corollaries of Theorems 2 and 3.
Corollary 1 Let (Q; T ) be an IC and IR outcome that satises S (Q () ; ) T () =
0.
(a) Dene P ID ()  Sq (Q () ; ) on domain f 2  : Q () > 0g. Then (Q; T )
is 1-ID-implementable if and only if (i) Q () 2 argmaxq0

S (q; )  P ID () q	
whenever Q () > 0, and (ii) P ID is nonnegative and nonincreasing.
(b) Dene PAD ()  T () =Q () on domain f 2  : Q () > 0g. Then (Q; T ) is
1-AD-implementable if and only if (i) Q () 2 argmaxqQ()

S (q; )  PAD () q	
whenever Q () > 0, and (ii) PAD is nonnegative and nonincreasing.
Proof. To see the su¢ ciency part of (a), suppose that the conditions hold. Denote
the domain of P ID as AID. Let T () = S (Q () ; ) R 

S (Q (x) ; x) dx, as suggested
by (2). It is straightforward to verify that
 
Q; T;AID; P ID

satises conditions 12
in Theorem 2 and that AID = f 2  : (Q () ; T ()) 6= (0; 0)g. Therefore, (Q; T )
can be implemented by 1-ID scheme. To see the necessity part of (a), suppose that
(Q; T ) is 1-ID-implementable. Then Theorem 2 implies the conditions. (Note that
(Q () ; T ()) 6= (0; 0) is equivalent to Q () > 0, from (2) and U ()  S (Q () ; ) 
T () = 0.)
Part (b) can be proved similarly by applying Theorem 3, with dening M () 
Q () for any  2 A  f 2  : Q () > 0g.
10It is because a monotonic function (e.g. Q in Theorem 1, P in Theorem 2,M and P in Theorem
3) can be arbitrarily well approximated by a step function.
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Remark 1 In applications one often assume that S (; ) is nondecreasing and con-
cave. If one do that, then part (a) of Corollary 1 can be simplied as: (Q; T ) is
1-ID-implementable if and only if Sq (Q () ; ) (which equals T 0 () =Q0 () when Q
and T are di¤erentiable at ) is nonincreasing on f 2  : Q () > 0g; and part (b)
can be simplied as: (Q; T ) is 1-AD-implementable if and only if T () =Q () is
nonincreasing on f 2  : Q () > 0g.
The following theorem ranks di¤erent sets of implementable outcomes.
Theorem 4 Let (Q; T ) be an IC and IR outcome that satises S (Q () ; ) T () =
0.
(a) (Q; T ) is 1-ADF-implementable.
(b) If (Q; T ) is 1-ID-implementable, then it is also 1-AD-implementable.
Part (a) of Theorem 4 says that it is without loss to use ADF schemes if we only
consider outcomes with nonnegative payment. Indeed, any such outcome (Q; T ) can
be implemented by an ADF scheme as follows: Set a large transfer payment   to
buyers (i.e., negative xed fee ) to induce consumers to participate; for every type 
with Q () > 0, put in the menu a minimum-purchase tari¤ with Q () being its min-
imum purchase, and with some P () being its marginal price such that the resulting
gross payment is T () (i.e., P ()Q ()+ = T ()). Note that since the upfront trans-
fer   is large, the marginal price P () must be large, so that the minimum-purchase
tari¤ characterized by (Q () ; P () ; ) is e¤ectively the single quantity-payment bun-
dle (Q () ; T ()). Therefore the above ADF scheme is e¤ectively the BD scheme that
implements (Q; T ).
Part (b) of Theorem 4 can be informally understood as follows. Under any ID
scheme, the e¤ective tari¤ function (i.e., minimum payment as a function of quantity)
must be concave. In contrast, for an e¤ective tari¤ function to be generated by an AD
scheme, it only has to have nonincreasing average per-unit price. If we only consider
tari¤ functions with nonnegative payment for zero order size (which is natural in
this monopolist context and is formally guaranteed by the condition S (Q () ; )  
T () = 0), then it is geometrically easy to see that concavity is strictly stronger than
nonincreasing average. That is, when the number of blocks is unrestricted, AD can
generate strictly more tari¤ functions than ID can.
An alternative way to understand part (b) of Theorem 4 is recalling the insights
from Figures 2 4. Under ID, the induced quantity function cannot be too at. When
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the number of blocks n tends to innity, the induced quantity function can become
smooth, but still cannot be atter than type-demand curve. In contrast, under BD
any nondecreasing quantity function can be induced when n tends to innity. Under
AD, which stands between BD and ID, induced quantity functions with portions
atter than type-demand curve are possible. In this sense, we say ID has the smallest
"implementation power" among the three forms, while BD has the largest.
Corollary 2  = BD1 = 
ADF
1  AD1  ID1 .
Proof. We have already claimed that  = BD1 . Since AD schemes are special cases
of ADF schemes, we also have ADF1  AD1 .
If an outcome (Q; T ) is second best, then it is IC and IR, and satises S (Q () ; ) 
T () = 0, then from part (a) of Theorem 4, (Q; T ) can be implemented by some ADF
scheme. Therefore  = ADF1 .
Now suppose that (Q; T ) is ID-optimal. Then it is implementable by some ID
scheme and hence IC and IR. It also satises S (Q () ; ) T () = 0, for if S (Q () ; ) 
T () > 0, the monopolist could increase prot by raising the xed fees of all two-part
tari¤s. From part (b) of Theorem 4, (Q; T ) can be implemented by some AD scheme.
Therefore AD1  ID1 .
Can ID or AD attain the second best prot? It amounts to apply Corollary 1 to
check whether some second best outcome can be implemented by ID or AD scheme.
In particular, if the second best outcome involves bunching (so that Sq (Q () ; ) is
increasing in the bunching region), then it cannot be implemented by ID scheme.
Corollary 3 (a)  = ID1 if and only if some second best quantity function Q
 satis-
es P  ()  Sq (Q () ; ) being nonnegative and nonincreasing on f 2  : Q () > 0g
and Q () 2 argmaxq0 fS (q; )  P  () qg whenever Q () > 0.
(b)  = AD1 if and only if some second best outcome (Q
; T ) satises P  () 
T  () =Q () being nonnegative and nonincreasing on f 2  : Q () > 0g and Q () 2
argmaxqQ() fS (q; )  P  () qg whenever Q () > 0.
Proof. It is straightforward from Corollary 1.
Remark 2 A set of su¢ cient conditions for  = ID (and hence  = AD) is:
the cost function c is linear, the hazard rate F 0 () = (1  F ()) of typesdistribution
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is nondecreasing, and consumersutility takes the form s (q)  t where s is a concave
function. Another set of su¢ cient conditions for  = AD on parameters is provided
in Maskin and Riley (1984) Proposition 6 (known as quantity discounts result).
Example 1 Suppose that S (q; ) = s (q) and  is uniformly distributed on [0; 1].
Let s () and c () take the following forms:
s (q) =
q

; c (q) =
q+1
+ 1
;
where  2 (0; 1) is a parameter (so that s is increasing and concave, and c is increasing
and convex). Then the second best outcome is
(Q () ; T  ()) =
( 
2   1; (2 1)(2+1)
2(1+)

if   1=2
(0; 0) if  < 1=2
:
Applying Corollary 3 and Remark 1, it is straightforward to verify that (Q; T ) is
1-ID-implementable if and only if   1=2, and is 1-AD-implementable if and only
if   p2=2. We conclude that  = ID1 if and only if   1=2, while  = AD1 if
and only if   p2=2.
4.2 Restricted number of options (nite n)
We now turn to the comparison among the three forms when the number of blocks
is restricted to be no larger than a nite n. It is a harder job because when n is
nite, the concepts of n-ID-implementability, n-ADF-implementability and n-BD-
implementability do not imply one another. While the second best outcome cannot
be implemented by any of the three forms when n is nite, the key to compare their
performances is to see which form can implement outcomes that better approximate
the second best.
While ID has the smallest implementation power (i.e., has the smallest set of
implementable outcomes) when n = 1, we will nonetheless see that ID has the
following advantage when n is nite. If a second best outcome can be implemented
by some ID scheme with innite blocks, then ID schemes with nite blocks can be
constructed to better approximate the second best outcome than AD schemes or BD
schemes with the same number of blocks do. In this sense, we say ID has the largest
"approximation power."
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In this subsection we impose the following regularity assumptions on the virtual
surplus function H, which ensure that second best outcome is essentially unique, and
better approximating the second best outcome raises prot.
Assumption 2 H is continuous. argmaxq0H (q; ) is single-valued and nonde-
creasing in . H (; ) is single-peaked (i.e., H (q; ) gets weakly higher when q gets
closer to the unique maximizer).
Lemma 1 Let Q be a second best quantity function. Let (Q1; T 1) and (Q2; T 2) be
two IC outcomes such that, for almost every  2 , either Q2 ()  Q1 ()  Q ()
or Q2 ()  Q1 ()  Q (), and S (Q1 () ; ) T 1 ()  S (Q2 () ; ) T 2 (). Then
the prot (1) generated by (Q1; T 1) is weakly higher than that generated by (Q2; T 2).
The last inequality is strict unless S (Q1 () ; )  T 1 () = S (Q2 () ; )  T 2 () and
Q1 () = Q2 () for almost every  2 .
Proof. Under Assumption 2, fQ ()g = argmaxq0H (q; ) for all  2  except
possibly  and . Apply formula (3).
Theorem 5 Suppose that  = ID1 and n is any nonnegative integer.
(a) IDn  ADFn , and this inequality is strict unless some n-ID-optimal outcome
coincides with some n-ADF-optimal outcome almost everywhere.
(b) IDn  BDn , and this inequality is strict unless some n-ID-optimal outcome
coincides with some n-BD-optimal outcome almost everywhere.
Remark 3 The condition  = ID1 in Theorem 5 is crucial. We have seen in
the last subsection that  = ADF1 = 
BD
1 and that 
ID
1 ;
ADF
1 ;
BD
1 are limits of
IDn ;
ADF
n ;
BD
n . Therefore, if 
 > ID1 , we must have 
ID
n < 
ADF
n and 
ID
n <
BDn for all large nite n.
Intuitively, if the second best is not intrinsically incompatible with ID, then for any
scheme involving bunching, one can construct an ID scheme that has discontinuities
for the same set of types, but over each block it allows better separation of types, and
therefore more surplus.
The idea of the proof of Theorem 5 is the following. To show IDn  ADFn ,
it amounts to show that, given an n-ADF-optimal outcome, there exists an n-ID-
implementable outcome whose quantity function is uniformly closer to the second
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Figure 5: Improving upon ADF by ID
best than the quantity function of the n-ADF-optimal outcome. In fact, we do not
need to know the characteristics of the n-ADF-optimal outcome except knowing that
it is n-ADF-implementable. Let us x n = 3 for example and start with some 3-ADF-
implementable outcome. The bold curve in Figure 5 illustrates the quantity function
QADF of such a 3-ADF-implementable outcome, and the thin curve illustrates the
second best quantity function Q. Under the assumption  = ID1 , Q
 is drawn
to cross every type-demand curve from below. (Recall that, for the second best
outcome to be implementable by some ID scheme, Q cannot be atter than type-
demand curves.) Then we can draw a quantity function QID of a 3-ID-implementable
outcome as shown by the dashed curve in Figure 5. Notice thatQID is uniformly closer
to Q than QADF . Now according to Lemma 1, the 3-ID-implementable outcome 
QID; T ID

that leaves the lowest type of consumer a zero rent would make a higher
prot than the original 3-ADF-implementable outcome does. Therefore IDn  ADFn .
We can similarly argue that IDn  BDn under the assumption  = ID1 .
5 Generalized environment
In this and the next sections, we develop a unifying framework that can simultaneously
analyze all the practical forms of pricing schemes studied in this paper. Moreover,
this framework works in a much more general environment, which we describe in this
section. The results in the next section, which are applied to prove the results in
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Section 3, relies only on the assumptions made in this section.
Consider a more general monopolistic nonlinear pricing problem. The domain for
quantities is denoted as , which can be any closed subset of R that includes 0. The
monopolists cost function c :  ! R and the cumulative distribution function F of
consumerstypes are irrelevant, except that the support of F still has to be an interval
 =

; 

. Consumersutility is still in the form S (q; )  t, and consumersoutside
option is still buying nothing and paying nothing. For the gross utility function
S : ! R, all we need are the following assumptions.
Assumption 3 S (0; ) = 0 for all  2 . For any q 2 , S (q; ) is absolutely
continuous (and hence almost everywhere di¤erentiable) in . For any  2 , S (q; )
is continuous in q. Moreover, S satises strictly increasing di¤erences in (q; ), i.e.,
q1  q2 and 1  2 imply
S (q2; 2)  S (q1; 2)  S (q2; 1)  S (q1; 1) ;
and the inequality becomes strict whenever q1 < q2 and 1 < 2.
Note that this general framework allows quantity to be discrete or continuous,
and Assumption 3 is very weak, so that our results can be adapted to many other
principal-agent settings. The only essential restriction in Assumption 3 is its last
sentence, which is the strict Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing property. Also note that
Assumption 3 is enough to imply Fact 1.
We now formalize the concepts of tari¤ option. A tari¤ option  is a function
that assigns each quantity q 2  a total payment  (q) 2 R [ f1g for purchasing q
units, such that  (q) <1 for some q 2 , and lim infx!q  (x) >  1 for all q 2 .11
The interpretation of  (q) = 1 is that purchasing q units is not allowed by the
tari¤ option  . The set
 ()  fq 2  :  (q) <1g
is called the domain of  , whose interpretation is the set of order sizes allowed by  .
Notice that our concept of tari¤ option is a general one: we formally allow the
payment associated with an order size to be innity to forbid that order size; we
11As usual, lim infx!q  (x) is dened by
lim
"#0
(inf f (x) : jx  qj < " and x 2 g) :
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also allow the payment to be negative, provided that it never converges to negative
innity. In this terminology, the consumersoutside option is also a tari¤ option. We
use  out to denote the tari¤ option that represents the outside option, i.e.,
 out (q) 
(
0 if q = 0
1 if q 2 n f0g :
6 Menu implementability
Let C be a class of tari¤ options, which is meant to be the class of "admissible" tari¤
options that the monopolist can put into a menu for the consumers to choose.
Denition 1 We say an outcome (Q; T ) is menu implementable with respect to
(n; C) (where n 2 N [ f1g and C is a class of tari¤ options) if it is induced by
a menu of at most n tari¤ options in C, i.e., there exist some set (menu) M  C
with jMj  n and some mapping (best response of consumers) that assigns each
consumerstype  2  a tari¤ option   2M[ f outg such that
1. T () =   (Q ()) for any  2 ,
2. S (Q () ; )  T ()  S (q; )   (q) for any  2 , q 2 ,  2M[ f outg.
Implementability by n-BD schemes, by n-ID schemes, and by n-ADF schemes are
all special cases of the above menu implementability with respect to (n; C). For n-BD
schemes, C is the set of all tari¤ options with singleton domain. For n-ID schemes, C
is the set of all two-part tari¤s. For n-ADF schemes with xed fee , C is the set of
all minimum purchase tari¤s with common xed fee .
In order to characterize our concept of menu implementability, we introduce some
notions. For any two tari¤ options  1 and  2, we say ( 1;  2) satises tari¤ single
crossing property if for any q1; q2 2  ( 1) [  ( 2) with q1 < q2, we have
 1 (q2)   2 (q2))  1 (q1)   2 (q1) ;
 1 (q1)   2 (q1))  1 (q2)   2 (q2) :
That is,  1 (q)   2 (q), regarded as a function of q and restricted on  ( 1) [  ( 2),
crosses or touches zero only once and only from below. The interpretation is that  2
is more favorable to purchasing large quantities than  1.
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For any two tari¤ options  1 and  2, we say ( 1;  2) satises tari¤ increasing
di¤erences if  1 (q)   2 (q) is nondecreasing in q on  ( 1) [  ( 2). Another way to
say that is: ( 1;  2) satises tari¤ increasing di¤erences i¤ ( 1;  2 + x) satises tari¤
single crossing property for any x 2 R. The interpretation is that  2 is more favorable
to purchasing incremental units than  1.
It is easy to see that if ( 1;  2) satises tari¤ increasing di¤erences, then it satises
tari¤ single crossing property.
Theorem 6 An outcome (Q; T ) is menu implementable with respect to (n; C) if it is
IC and IR, and for every  2  there exists some tari¤ option   2 C [ f outg such
that
1. T () =   (Q ()) for any  2 ,
2. S (Q () ; )  T ()  S (q; )    (q) for any  2 , q 2 ,
3. increasing di¤erences monotonicity: if 1 < 2 then ( 1 ;  2) satises tari¤
increasing di¤erences,
4.
f g2 n f outg  n.
Theorem 7 Theorem 6 still holds if condition 3 is replaced by
3a. single crossing monotonicity: if 1 < 2 then ( 1 ;  2) satises tari¤ single
crossing property,
3b. T ()   0 (Q ()) for any ; 0 2 .
Theorems 6 and 7 can be informally understood as follows. If the monopolist is
free to o¤er any pricing scheme, it is without loss of generality to restrict attention
to o¤ering a direct revelation mechanism (Q; T ) (which asks consumers to report
types and species a quantity-payment bundle for each reported type) that satises
incentive compatibility constraint and individual rationality constraint (so that it is
equivalent to BD schemes). Now the monopolist is restricted to o¤ering a menu of
tari¤ options in C, then it is only without loss of generality to restrict attention to
o¤ering a revelation mechanism (the mapping  7!   in Theorem 6) that species
for each reported type a tari¤ option in C [ f outg, after which the consumer is free
to choose any order size allowed by the chosen tari¤ option.
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The issue of individual rationality simply does not change. The issue of incentive
compatibility now has two parts. First, the consumer should be willing to choose
the desired order size given the tari¤ option designated for her. This part is con-
dition 2 in Theorem 6. Second, the consumer should be willing to choose the tari¤
option designated for her (i.e., report the true type). This second part is stronger
than requiring (Q; T ) to be incentive-compatible. Since a direct revelation mecha-
nism species a particular quantity-payment bundle once a consumers type has been
reported, so a consumer has an incentive to report a false type only if she prefers the
quantity-payment bundle designated for that false type. In contrast, under a reve-
lation mechanism  7!   which species a tari¤ option after reporting, a consumer
has some exibility to choose the quantity-payment bundle after a type has been re-
ported, as long as the tari¤ option specied for that reported type is not degenerate.
Hence a consumer has an incentive to report a false type whenever she prefers any
quantity-payment bundle allowed by the tari¤ option designated for that false type.
Then what condition can guarantee this second part? Under a direct revela-
tion mechanism, it is well known that incentive compatibility requires monotonicity:
higher type consumers should purchase more. Under the aforementioned revelation
mechanism  7!  , it turns out that a natural extension of this monotonicity suf-
ces: higher type consumers should pick tari¤options that are favorable to purchasing
more. The latter is formalized by increasing di¤erences monotonicity (i.e., condition
3 in Theorem 6). If we replace increasing di¤erences monotonicity by the related but
weaker condition single crossing monotonicity (i.e., condition 3a in Theorem 7), then
the additional condition 3b in Theorem 7 is needed.
Remark 4 Notice that in Theorems 6 and 7, condition 3b clearly has to be satis-
ed anyway (for   to be the consumers best response). So actually condition 3,
together with other conditions, implies condition 3(including 3a and 3b). However,
the su¢ ciency of condition 3 is worth knowing on top of knowing the su¢ ciency of
condition 3, because for some applications condition 3 is more useful. Indeed, in our
applications in Section 3, checking increasing di¤erences monotonicity is not harder
than checking single crossing monotonicity and hence we do not need to worry about
condition 3b.
The necessity counterparts of Theorems 6 and 7 require some restrictions on C [
f outg. We say C [ f outg is closed if it is closed under the product topology in the
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space of tari¤ options (i.e., whenever a net in C[f outg pointwise converges to a tari¤
option, this tari¤ option is also in C [ f outg.) For any two tari¤ options  1 and  2,
we say  1 dominates  2 if  1 (q)   2 (q) for any q 2 , and the inequality is strict for
some q 2 . We say C[f outg is increasing di¤erences comparable if for any two tari¤
options  1 and  2 in C [f outg which are not dominated by each other, either ( 1;  2)
or ( 2;  1) satises tari¤ increasing di¤erences. Similarly, we say C [ f outg is single
crossing comparable if for any two tari¤ options  1 and  2 in C [ f outg which are
not dominated by each other, either ( 1;  2) or ( 2;  1) satises tari¤ single crossing
property.
Theorem 8 For an outcome (Q; T ) to be menu implementable with respect to (n; C),
the su¢ cient conditions provided by Theorem 6 are also necessary if (i) n is nite or
C[f outg is closed, and (ii) C[f outg is increasing di¤erences comparable. Similarly,
for an outcome (Q; T ) to be menu implementable with respect to (n; C), the su¢ cient
conditions provided by Theorem 7 are also necessary if (i) n is nite or C [ f outg is
closed, and (ii) C [ f outg is single crossing comparable.
Theorems 6 and 8 can be translated into necessary and su¢ cient conditions for
implementability by n-BD schemes, by n-ID schemes, and by n-ADF schemes. In
particular, the increasing di¤erences monotonicity condition in Theorem 6 translates
into the monotonicity of marginal price (i.e., condition 2 in Theorem 2) in the context
of n-ID schemes, and translates into the monotonicity of minimum purchase and
marginal price (i.e., condition 3 in Theorem 3) in the context of n-ADF schemes.
7 Concluding remarks
We compare maximum prots of bundling, incremental discounts and all-units dis-
counts in the context of monopolistic nonlinear pricing. The comparison hinges on
whether the number of pricing blocks is restricted. We also develop a theory of menu
implementability for general principal-agent settings.
Our comparison among bundling (BD), incremental discounts (ID) and all-units
discounts with xed fee (ADF) in the context of nonlinear pricing sheds lights on a
general issue: how should an uninformed principal choose among di¤erent practical
contract forms to o¤er to an informed agent? If the level of contract complexity and
communication between the principal and the agent are unlimited, it is well known
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that restricting to direct revelation mechanisms is without loss. A heuristic reason
is that direct revelation mechanisms have full control over the agents action once
the agents private information is reported. Hence, under appropriately chosen direct
revelation mechanism, the harm of private information is minimal. However, when
contract complexity or communication is limited, it might pay to leave certain kind
of exibility or discretion power to the agent.
The above trade-o¤ between control and exibility explains the ranking among
BD, ID and ADF. BD exhibits the largest control: each option species a single
quantity. ID exhibits the smallest control: a two-part tari¤ does not directly control
quantity, but only control indirectly through a marginal price. ADF is somehow
in the middle: a minimum purchase tari¤ controls quantity through both a direct
instrument, minimum purchase, and an indirect instrument, marginal price. This
is why when the number of blocks (contract complexity) is unrestricted, BD has
the largest and ID the smallest implementation power (Theorem 4 and Corollary 2).
When the number of blocks is restricted, ID leaves certain kind of exibility (one
constrained by price) to the agent. Leaving exibility to the agent, or giving up some
control, in general may or may not be good since the agent has di¤erent interest from
the principal. However, if the control loss implied by such kind of exibility can be
fully overcome when the number of blocks is unrestricted (i.e.,  = ID1 ), then this
kind of exibility must help the approximation to second best. This is why ID has
the largest approximation power (Theorem 5 and the paragraph thereafter).
The lesson is: when contract complexity is limited for practical concerns, the prin-
cipal might gain from leaving to the agent some kind of exibility that is nonbinding
under unlimited contract complexity.
Appendix
The proof of Theorem 6 requires the following notation and lemma.
For any tari¤ option  , we let  inf :  ! R [ f1g denote the highest lower
semi-continuous function that is weakly lower than  . That is, for each q 2 ,
 inf (q) = lim infx!q  (x). Clearly,  inf is also a tari¤ option; and  inf =  if and only
if  is lower semi-continuous.
Lemma 2 If ( 1;  2) satises tari¤ increasing di¤erences, then
 
 inf1 ; 
inf
2

satises
tari¤ increasing di¤erences.
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Proof. We must show that if  1 (q)   2 (q) is nondecreasing in q on  ( 1) [  ( 2),
then  inf1 (q)   inf2 (q) is nondecreasing in q on 
 
 inf1
[   inf2 . Let 1   ( 1) and
2   ( 2). Notice that 
 
 inf1

= cl (1) and 
 
 inf2

= cl (2).
12
Suppose that  inf1 (q)   inf2 (q) is not nondecreasing in q on cl (1)[ cl (2). Then
there exist q1; q2 2 cl (1) [ cl (2) such that q1 < q2 and
 inf1 (q1)   inf2 (q1) >  inf1 (q2)   inf2 (q2) : (6)
(Since q1; q2 2 
 
 inf1
[    inf2 , both sides of (6) are not 1 1 and hence are well
dened.) (6) implies  inf2 (q1) <1 and  inf1 (q2) <1. Since  2 (x) <1 i¤ x 2 2, we
have
 inf2 (q1) = lim inf
x!q1
 2 (x) = lim inf
x22 & x!q1
 2 (x) :
Since  1 (x) <1 i¤ x 2 1, we have
 inf1 (q2) = lim inf
x!q2
 1 (x) = lim inf
x21 & x!q2
 1 (x) :
Then,
 inf1 (q1)   inf2 (q1) = lim inf
x!q1
 1 (x)  lim inf
x22 & x!q1
 2 (x)
 lim inf
x22 & x!q1
 1 (x)  lim inf
x22 & x!q1
 2 (x)
 lim sup
x22 & x!q1
 1 (x)  lim inf
x22 & x!q1
 2 (x)
= lim sup
x22 & x!q1
( 1 (x)   2 (x)) ;
and
 inf1 (q2)   inf2 (q2) = lim inf
x21 & x!q2
 1 (x)  lim inf
x!q2
 2 (x)
 lim inf
x21 & x!q2
 1 (x)  lim inf
x21 & x!q2
 2 (x)
 lim inf
x21 & x!q2
 1 (x)  lim sup
x21 & x!q2
 2 (x)
= lim inf
x21 & x!q2
( 1 (x)   2 (x)) :
12As usual, cl denotes closure.
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Now, (6) implies that
lim sup
x22 & x!q1
( 1 (x)   2 (x)) > lim inf
x21 & x!q2
( 1 (x)   2 (x)) :
Thus, there exist sequences qm1 ! q1 on 2 and qm2 ! q2 on 1 such that, for all m,
 1 (q
m
1 )    2 (qm1 ) >  1 (qm2 )    2 (qm2 ) and qm1 < qm2 , and hence  1 (q)    2 (q) is not
nondecreasing in q on  ( 1) [  ( 2).
Proof of Theorem 6. Fix any (n; C) and any outcome (Q; T ). Suppose that the
conditions in the theorem are satised. Consider the menuM = f g2 n f outg  C.
Then jMj  n (from condition 4) and condition 1 in Denition 1 are satised (from
condition 1). Suppose by way of contradiction that (Q; T ) is not menu implementable
with respect to (n; C). Then condition 2 in Denition 1 is violated, i.e.,
S (Q (1) ; 1)  T (1) < S (q0; 1)   0 (q0) (7)
for some 1 2 , q0 2 ,  0 2 f g2 [ f outg.
In (7), if  0 =  out, then q0 = 0 (otherwise the right-hand side is  1), then the
right-hand side is 0, contradicting to the IR of (Q; T ). Therefore  0 =  2 for some
2 2 .
Let 0   \  Q () ; Q   [ fq0g. For any  2  and any tari¤ option  , we
dene
V ( ; )  sup
q2
fS (q; )   (q)g ; V + ( ; )  sup
q20
fS (q; )   (q)g ;
D ( ; )  argmax
q2
fS (q; )   (q)g ; D+ ( ; )  argmax
q20
fS (q; )   (q)g :
For any  2 , we have Q () 2 D ( ; ) and hence U ()  S (Q () ; ) T () =
V ( ; ), due to conditions 1 and 2. Then S (q; )     (q) must be upper semi-
continuous in q at Q (), and hence   (Q ()) =  inf (Q ()). Then Q () 2 D
 
 inf ; 

.
Since Q () 2 0, we also have Q () 2 D+   inf ; . It follows that
U () = V ( ; ) = V
 
 inf ; 

= V +
 
 inf ; 

: (8)
For any ; 0 2 , D+   inf0 ;  is nonempty since 0 is compact and the objective
function is upper semi-continuous in q (from the continuity of S (; ) and the lower
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semi-continuity of  inf0 ). Also, clearly V
+
 
 inf0 ; 

= V + ( 0 ; ).
Since q0 2 0, (7) implies U (1) < S (q0; 1)    inf2 (q0)  V +
 
 inf2 ; 1

. Moreover,
(8) implies U (2) = V +
 
 inf2 ; 2

. In other words, the value of U () is strictly be-
low the value of V +
 
 inf2 ; 

at 1, but the values of these two functions are equal
at 2. By IC of (Q; T ) and Fact 1, U () is absolutely continuous, and U 0 (x) =
S (Q (x) ; x) for almost every x 2 . By Envelope Theorem (in the version of Mil-
grom and Segal (2002)), V +
 
 inf2 ; 

is absolutely continuous, and @V +
 
 inf2 ; x

=@x =
S
 
d+
 
 inf2 ; x

; x

for almost every x 2 , where d+   inf2 ;  is any selection from
D+
 
 inf2 ; 

.
It follows that, if 1 < 2, then there is some x0 2 [1; 2] such that U (x0) <
V +
 
 inf2 ; x0

and U 0 (x0) > @V +
 
 inf2 ; x0

=@x0, and then S (Q (x0) ; x0) > S
 
d+
 
 inf2 ; x0

; x0

,
and then Q (x0) > d+
 
 inf2 ; x0

. (Notice that Assumption 3 implies that S (q; ) is
nondecreasing in q.) Similarly, if 1 > 2, then there is some x0 2 [2; 1] such that
U (x0) < V
+
 
 inf2 ; x0

and Q (x0) < d+
 
 inf2 ; x0

.
Increasing di¤erences monotonicity (condition 3) and Lemma 2 imply that S (q; ) 
 inf0 (q) satises increasing di¤erences in (q; 
0). By monotone comparative statics (see
Topkis (1978) or Milgrom and Shannon (1994)), we obtain that, given any  2 ,
D+
 
 inf0 ; 

is nondecreasing in 0 in the strong set order s. (For any D1; D2  R,
D1 s D2 i¤ d1 2 D1 and d2 2 D2 imply min fd1; d2g 2 D1 and max fd1; d2g 2 D2.) If
0 < , then D+
 
 inf0 ; 
 s D+   inf ; , then there is some d 2 D+   inf0 ;  such that
d  Q (). (Recall that Q () 2 D+   inf ;  and D+   inf0 ;  is nonempty.) Similarly,
if 0 > , then there is some d 2 D+   inf0 ;  such that d  Q (). Now, we pick a
selection d+
 
 inf0 ; 

from D+
 
 inf0 ; 

such that
d+
 
 inf0 ; 
 
=

Q () if 0
<
=
>
:
It contradicts to our previous claim when we take 0 as 2 and  as x0.
Proof of Theorem 7. The proof of Theorem 6 still goes through except the last
paragraph, which is now replaced by the following.
Since d+
 
 inf2 ; x

is some selection of D+
 
 inf2 ; x0

, there exists a sequence fdig on
 ( 2) such that d
i ! d+   inf2 ; x0 and S (di; x0)   2 (di)! V +   inf2 ; x0. Consider
1 < 2. From our previous claim (in the proof of Theorem 6), for all large enough i,
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we have
U (x0) < S
 
di; x0
   2  di and Q (x0) > di:
Let i be large enough so that the above properties hold. Since U (x0)  S (di; x0)  
x0 (d
i), we have S (di; x0)  x0 (di) < S (di; x0)   2 (di) and then x0 (di) >  2 (di).
On the other hand, condition 3b implies x0 (Q (x0)) = T (x0)   2 (Q (x0)). Then
single crossing monotonicity (condition 3a) implies x0 (d
i)   2 (di), becauseQ (x0) 2
 (x0) (since x0 (Q (x0)) = T (x0) < 1), di 2  ( 2), x0  2 and Q (x0) > di. We
have a contradiction. By an analogous argument, the case of 1 > 2 also yields a
contradiction.
The proof of Theorem 8 requires the following two lemmas.
Lemma 3 If an outcome (Q; T ) is menu implementable with respect to (n; C), with
either n nite or C [ f outg closed, then the associated menuM (that is contained in
C, has at most n elements, and induces (Q; T )) can be chosen such that
1. for any q 2 , argmin2M[foutg  (q) is nonempty, and
2. the tari¤ options inM do not dominate one another.
Proof. Suppose that (Q; T ) is menu implementable with respect to (n; C), i.e., (Q; T )
is induced by some menuM  C with jMj  n. Let  :  ! R [ f 1;1g denote
the lower envelope ofM[ f outg, i.e.,  (q)  inf2M[foutg  (q).
If n is nite, thenM[f outg is a nonempty nite set. We delete any dominated
tari¤ options inM so that condition 2 holds. After the deletion,M[f outg is still a
nonempty nite set so that condition 1 holds, and the lower envelope ofM[ f outg
is the same as before so that (Q; T ) is still induced.
We hereafter suppose that n =1 and C[f outg is closed. Let	  f 2 C [ f outg :   g.
Also, for any q 2 , we dene the following partial orderq over tari¤options: for any
tari¤options  1;  2, we say  1 q  2 i¤ either  1 (q) <  2 (q), or  1 (q) =  2 (q) &  1 
 2 on n fqg. Then (	;q) is a partially ordered set. Notice that 	 is closed since
C [ f outg is closed. We claim that every chain in (	;q) has a lower bound in 	.
Indeed, any chain in (	;q), when regarded as a net directed downward by q, must
have a pointwise limit in 	, and this pointwise limit is a lower bound of the chain.
By Zorns Lemma, (	;q) has a minimal element  q. By Axiom of Choice, there
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exists a family

 q
	
q2 of tari¤ options such that every  q is a minimal element of
(	;q).
Regard

 q
	
q2 n f outg as a menu. By our construction, this menu is contained
in C. For any q; q0 2 ,  q (q) =  (q)   q0 (q). Thus this menu satises condition
1. Since

 q
	
q2 andM[f outg share a common lower envelope  ,

 q
	
q2 n f outg
induces the same outcome asM does. Finally, if  q is dominated by  q0, then  q is
not a minimal element of 	, a contradiction. Therefore, our menu satises condition
2.
Lemma 4 If tari¤ options  1; : : : ; n do not dominate one another, and ( 1;  2),
( 2;  3), : : :, (n 1; n) and (n;  1) satisfy tari¤ single crossing property or tari¤
increasing di¤erences, then  1 =    = n.
Proof. We will use the induction argument. Let n = 2 rst. Suppose that  1 6=  2,
and both ( 1;  2) and ( 2;  1) satisfy tari¤ single crossing property. Then pick some
x 2  such that  1 (x) 6=  2 (x). Without loss of generality, assume  1 (x) <  2 (x).
Since ( 1;  2) satises tari¤ single crossing property,  1 (q)   2 (q) for all q 2  with
q < x. Since ( 2;  1) satises tari¤ single crossing property,  1 (q)   2 (q) for all
q 2  with q > x. Therefore  2 is dominated by  1. (If  1 (x) >  2 (x), one can prove
that  1 is dominated by  2.) Hence, the lemma holds for n = 2.
Assume the induction hypothesis: the lemma holds for n = 2; 3; : : : ; k. Suppose
that  1;  2; : : : ;  k+1 do not dominate one another, and ( 1;  2) ; ( 2;  3) ; : : : ; ( k;  k+1)
and ( k+1;  1) satisfy tari¤ single crossing property. If  i =  j for some i; j 2
f1; : : : ; k + 1g with i 6= j, then the induction hypothesis implies that  1 =    =
 k+1, and we are done. So suppose that  1; : : : ;  k+1 are all distinct. Consider any
i 2 f1; : : : ; kg. Since  i and  i+1 are distinct and do not dominate each other,
there exist xi; yi 2  such that  i (xi) <  i+1 (xi) and  i (yi) >  i+1 (yi). Since
( i;  i+1) satises tari¤ single crossing property, xi < yi. Let I 2 argmini2f1;:::;kg xi
and J 2 argmaxi2f1;:::;kg yi. Because ( 1;  2) ; : : : ; ( k;  k+1) satisfy tari¤ single cross-
ing property, we have  1 (xI)       I (xI) <  I+1 (xI)       k+1 (xI) and
 1 (yJ)      J (yJ) > J+1 (yJ)       k+1 (yJ). But we also have xI < yJ ,
hence ( k+1;  1) does not satisfy tari¤ single crossing property.
Remark 5 In fact, the proof of Lemma 4 only requires a weaker version of tari¤
single crossing property, namely, ( 1;  2) is said to satisfy this weaker version of tari¤
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single crossing property if for any q1; q2 2  with q1 < q2, we have  1 (q1)   2 (q1)
whenever  1 (q2) <  2 (q2).
Proof of Theorem 8. Suppose that conditions (i) and (ii) hold and an outcome
(Q; T ) is menu implementable with respect to (n; C). Then there exist some menu
M  C with jMj  n and some mapping  7!   in (M[ f outg) such that
conditions 1 and 2 in Denition 1 are satised. Then clearly (Q; T ) is IC and IR.
Let   f g2 M[ f outg. By condition (i) and Lemma 3, we can without
loss of generality assume that the tari¤ options in  do not dominate one another.
To introduce convenient notation, we write  1 E  2 if ( 1;  2) satises tari¤ in-
creasing di¤erences. Obviously, E is a reexive binary relation over tari¤ options.
Increasing di¤erences comparability of C [ f outg (condition (ii)) carries over to 
(because   C[f outg). Thus, E is complete on . From Lemma 4, E is anti-
symmetric on . From reexivity, completeness and Lemma 4, E is transitive on
. Therefore, E is a linear order on . It makes  a chain.
Dene T () as the set f 2  :  (Q ())   0 (Q ()) for any  0 2 g. T () is
nonempty because   2 T () for every  2  (due to conditions 1 and 2 in Denition
1). Let Es be the strong set order on  induced by E. That is, for any two subsets
T1; T2 of , we say T1 Es T2 if  1 2 T1 and  2 2 T2 and  2 E  1 imply  1 2 T2 and
 2 2 T1. Then Es is a partial order on the set P () of nonempty subsets of .
We want to show that the mapping T is nondecreasing on ((;) ; (P () ;Es)).
Consider any 1; 2 2  such that 1 < 2, and we need to show T (1) Es T (2).
Suppose  1 2 T (1) and  2 2 T (2) and  2 E  1. Let q1  Q (1) and q2  Q (2).
From IC of (Q; T ), we have q1  q2. From IR of (Q; T ), we have S (q1; 1)   1 (q1) 
S (q1; 1)    1 (q1) = S (q1; 1)   T (1)  0 so that  1 (q1) < 1, and similarly
 2 (q2) <1. Thus q1 2  ( 1) and q2 2  ( 2). Since  1 2 T (1) and  2 2 T (2), we
have  1 (q1)   2 (q1) and  2 (q2)   1 (q2). Now it follows from  2 E  1 and q1  q2
that  1 (q2)   2 (q2) and  2 (q1)   1 (q1), and hence  1 2 T (2) and  2 2 T (1).
Therefore, T (1) Es T (2). We conclude that the mapping T is nondecreasing on
((;) ; (P () ;Es)).
Regard T as a correspondence from  to . Our previous results show that T is
nonempty-valued and nondecreasing (with respect to the strong set order induced by
E), so that it has a nondecreasing selection  7!   (see Kukushkin (2012) Theorem
2).
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Now this mapping  7!   satises conditions 3 and 4 in Theorem 6. It satises
condition 1 in Theorem 6 because T () =   (Q ()) = min02  0 (Q ()) =   (Q ())
for any  2 . It also satises condition 2 in Theorem 6 because
S (Q () ; )    (Q ()) = S (Q () ; )    (Q ())  S (q; )    (q)
for any  2  and any q 2 . It completes the proof of the rst part.
For the second part, assume condition (ii) instead of condition (ii). The above
proof still goes through except that the binary relation E requires to be redened:
 1 E  2 if and only if ( 1;  2) satises tari¤ single crossing property.
Proof of Theorem 1. Simply notice that, from Fact 1, if (Q; T ) is IC and Q () is
constant over an interval, then T () is also constant over that interval.
The proofs of Theorems 2 and 3 require the following lemmas, which characterize
the closures13 of the set of two-part tari¤s and the set of common-xed-fee minimum
purchase tari¤s.14
Lemma 5 A tari¤ option ^ is the pointwise limit of some net of two-part tari¤s if
and only if either  (^) = f0g (i.e., the domain of ^ is f0g), or ^ is a two-part tari¤.
Proof. The "if" part is quite obvious, so we only prove the "only if" part. Let fg
be a net of two-part tari¤s, with each  characterized by
 
p; 

. Suppose that
it pointwise converges to a tari¤ option ^ . Since each  is nondecreasing, ^ is too.
Then ^ (0) 6=  1 (otherwise ^ is not a tari¤ option) and ^ (0) 6= 1 (otherwise ^
is 1 everywhere and hence not a tari¤ option). If ^ (1) = 1, then ^ (q) = 1 for
all q > 0 (since each  is linear), so that  (^) = f0g. Now suppose that ^ (1) is
nite. Then both ^  ^ (0) and p^  ^ (1)   ^ (0) are nite. Moreover, we have
 =  (0)! ^ (0) = ^ and p =  (1)   (0)! ^ (1)  ^ (0) = ^. Then, for any
q  0,
 (q)  (p^q + ^) = (p   p^)q + (   ^)! 0:
Therefore,  pointwise converges to q 7! p^q + ^, which is a two-part tari¤.
13As usual, the closure C of a set C of tari¤ options is dened as the smallest closed set of tari¤
options that contains C, i.e. C comprises all tari¤ options that is a pointwise limit of a net in C.
14Lemma 5 is needed only for the necessity part of Theorem 2 when n =1. Similarly Lemma 6
is needed only for the necessity part of Theorem 3 when n =1.
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Lemma 6 Given  2 R, a tari¤ option ^ is the pointwise limit of some net of
minimum purchase tari¤s with common xed fee  if and only if either  (^) = f0g
and ^ (0) = , or ^ is a minimum purchase tari¤ with xed fee , or ^ is a "strict-
minimum purchase tari¤ with xed fee " of the form
q 7!
(
pq +  if q > m
1 if 0  q  m :
(Strict-minimum purchase tari¤s di¤er from minimum purchase tari¤s in that the
order size has to be strictly larger than the minimum purchase.)
Proof. The "if" part is quite obvious, so we only prove the "only if" part. Let fg be
a net of minimum purchase tari¤s, with each  characterized by (m; p; ). Suppose
that it pointwise converges to a tari¤ option ^ . Since ^ is a tari¤ option, its domain
 (^) is nonempty. If  (^) = f0g, clearly ^ (0) = . Suppose that  (^) 6= f0g. Let
m^  inf  (^)  0. Then m ! m^. For any q > m^, ^ (q) is the limit of fpq + g,
and then ^ (q) cannot be 1, for otherwise p ! 1 and hence  (^) is either f0g or
empty. Now p^  ^ (m^+ 2)  ^ (m^+ 1) is nite. Moreover, for large ,
p =  (m^+ 2)   (m^+ 1)! ^ (m^+ 2)  ^ (m^+ 1) = p^:
Therefore, for any q > m^, we have ^ (q) = lim  (q) = lim (pq + ) = p^q + . For
any q < m^, we have ^ (q) = lim  (q) = 1. The limit ^ (q) of f (m^)g must be
either lim pq+ = p^q+ or1. We conclude that ^ is the minimum purchase tari¤
or the strict-minimum purchase tari¤ characterized by (m^; p^; ).
Proof of Theorem 2. Let C be the set of all two-part tari¤s, and C be the closure
of C, which is characterized by Lemma 5.
Su¢ ciency. Suppose that P : A ! R+ satises the conditions in this theorem.
For each  2 , let   be  out if  2 A, and be the two-part tari¤ characterized by
(P () ; ()) if  2 nA, where  ()  T ()  P ()Q (). It su¢ ces to verify that
the mapping  7!   satises the su¢ cient conditions provided in Theorem 6. Notice
that 1 < 2 and Q (2) = T (2) = 0 imply Q (1) = T (1) = 0, by IC of (Q; T ) and
Fact 1. Hence A is an increasing subset of . (That is, 1 2 A and 1 < 2 2 
imply 2 2 A.) It, together with condition 2, implies that  7!   satises condition
3 in Theorem 6. Condition 1 and the denition of A and  imply conditions 1 and 2
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in Theorem 6. IC of (Q; T ) and Fact 1 imply that, for any  2 A and  2 ,
 () = S (Q () ; )  P ()Q () 
Z 

S (Q (x) ; x) dx  U () ;
where U ()  S (Q () ; )  T (). If P () is some constant p over an interval in
A, then, for any ;  in that interval,
 () = v (P () ; ) 
Z 

v (P (x) ; x) dx  U ()
= v (p; ) 
Z 

v (p; x) dx  U () = v (p; )  U () ;
where v (p; )  supq0 fS (q; )  pqg. Hence  () is constant over that interval.
Therefore, condition 3 implies that condition 4 in Theorem 6 holds.
Necessity. Suppose that (Q; T ) can be implemented by some n-ID scheme. In
other words, (Q; T ) is menu implementable with respect to (n; C). Then (Q; T ) is
also menu implementable with respect to
 
n; C.15 Notice that C [ f outg = C, which
is closed. Take any  1;  2 2 C. If  ( 1) = f0g, then ( 1;  2) satises tari¤ increasing
di¤erences. If  ( 1) 6= f0g and  ( 2) 6= f0g (so that both  1 and  2 are two-part
tari¤s), then ( 1;  2) (respectively ( 2;  1)) satises tari¤ increasing di¤erences if and
only if p1  p2 (respectively p2  p1), where pi denotes the marginal price of  i.
Hence, C [f outg is increasing di¤erences comparable. By Theorem 8, the conditions
provided by Theorem 6 are satised by some mapping  7!   in
 
C [ f outg

. For
any  2  such that   62 C [f outg, by Lemma 5,  ( ) = f0g, and hence Q () = 0.
Let 0  f 2  : Q () = 0g. By IC of (Q; T ) and Fact 1, every  2 0 has the
same T (), which we denote as t0. If 0 is nonempty and t0 = 0, then we redene
every   with  2 0 as  out. If 0 is nonempty and t0 6= 0, then we redene every  
with  2 0 as a two-part tari¤ characterized by (p0; t0), such that consumers of type
 2 0 would pick quantity q = 0 (this two-part tari¤ exists because (Q; T ) can be
implemented by some n-ID scheme). Clearly this p0 can be chosen to be higher than
the marginal price of every other two-part tari¤ in f g2n0. Now the new mapping
 7!   is in (C [ f outg) and still satises the conditions provided by Theorem 6.
Since f g2 n f outg  C, we can for each  2 A dene P () as the marginal price
15If we only consider the case of nite n, we do not need to work with C, and this proof would be
simpler. The same remark can be made for the necessity proof of Theorem 3.
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of  . Then conditions 13 follow from conditions 14 in Theorem 6.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let C be the set of all minimum purchase tari¤s with xed
fee , and C be the closure of C, which is characterized by Lemma 6.
Su¢ ciency. Suppose that M : A! R+ and P : A! R+ satises the conditions
in this theorem. For each  2 , let   be  out if  2 A, and be the minimum
purchase tari¤ characterized by (M () ; P () ; ) if  2 nA. It su¢ ces to verify
that the mapping  7!   satises the su¢ cient conditions provided in Theorem 6.
Notice that 1 < 2 and Q (2) = T (2) = 0 imply Q (1) = T (1) = 0, by IC of
(Q; T ) and Fact 1. Hence A is an increasing subset of . It, together with condition
3, implies that  7!   satises condition 3 in Theorem 6. Conditions 1 and 2 and
the denition of A imply conditions 1 and 2 in Theorem 6. Condition 4 implies that
condition 4 in Theorem 6 holds. If in addition n =1, clearly the function M can be
chosen as the restriction of Q on A without a¤ecting the validity of conditions 1 and
3.
Necessity. Suppose that (Q; T ) can be implemented by some n-ADF scheme
with xed fee . In other words, (Q; T ) is menu implementable with respect to
(n; C). Then (Q; T ) is also menu implementable with respect to  n; C. Notice that
C [ f outg is closed since C is. Take any  1;  2 2 C [ f outg. If  ( 1) = f0g, then
( 1;  2) satises tari¤ increasing di¤erences. If  ( 1) 6= f0g and  ( 2) 6= f0g (so that
both  1 and  2 are minimum purchase tari¤s or strict-minimum purchase tari¤s with
xed fee ), then they do not dominate each other if and only if either  ( 2) is a
proper subset of  ( 1) and p2 < p1, or  ( 1) is a proper subset of  ( 2) and p1 < p2,
where pi denotes the marginal price of  i. In the rst case (respectively second
case), ( 1;  2) (respectively ( 2;  1)) satises tari¤ increasing di¤erences. Hence, C [
f outg is increasing di¤erences comparable. By Theorem 8, the conditions provided
by Theorem 6 are satised by some mapping  7!   in
 
C [ f outg

. For any  2 
such that   62 C [ f outg, by Lemma 6, either   is a strict-minimum purchase tari¤,
or  ( ) = f0g and hence Q () = 0. For any  2  such that   is a strict-minimum
purchase tari¤ characterized by (m; p; ), we redene   as the minimum purchase
tari¤ characterized by (m; p; ), so that   2 C and picking the original quantity
q = Q () is still optimal under the new   for consumers of type  (since S (q; )
is continuous in q). Let 0  f 2  : Q () = 0g. By IC of (Q; T ) and Fact 1,
every  2 0 has the same T (), which we denote as t0. Clearly t0 2 f0; g. If 0 is
nonempty and t0 = 0, then we redene every   with  2 0 as  out. If 0 is nonempty
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and t0 = , then we redene every   with  2 0 as a minimum purchase tari¤
characterized by (0; p0; ), such that consumers of type  2 0 would pick quantity
q = 0 (this minimum purchase tari¤ exists because (Q; T ) can be implemented by
some n-ADF scheme with xed fee ). Clearly this p0 can be chosen to be higher
than the marginal price of every other minimum purchase tari¤ in f g2n0. Now
the new mapping  7!   is in (C [ f outg) and still satises the conditions provided
by Theorem 6. Since f g2 n f outg  C, we can for each  2 A dene M () and
P () as the minimum purchase and the marginal price of  . Then conditions 14
follow from conditions 14 in Theorem 6.
Proof of Theorem 4. It follows from IC of (Q; T ), Fact 1 and U ()  S (Q () ; ) 
T () = 0 that T () = 0 wheneverQ () = 0. Therefore, A  f 2  : (Q () ; T ()) 6= (0; 0)g =
f 2  : Q () > 0g.
Part (a). It su¢ ces to construct  2 R, M : A ! R+ and P : A ! R+
such that conditions 13 in Theorem 3 hold. (The number n is taken as 1 so that
condition 4 in Theorem 3 trivially holds.) For each  2 A, we let M ()  Q ()
and P ()  (T ()  ) =Q (), where the parameter  2 R is chosen to be small
(i.e., negative with large magnitude). Then condition 1 in Theorem 3 holds and
M is nondecreasing. Clearly, when  is small enough so that P () is large enough,
condition 2 in Theorem 3 holds. Using IC of (Q; T ) and Fact 1, it is straightforward to
verify that P is nonincreasing when  is small enough. Hence condition 3 in Theorem
3 also holds.
Part (b). Suppose that (Q; T ) is 1-ID-implementable. By Theorem 2, there
exists a nonincreasing function P ID : A! R+ such that
Q () 2 argmax
q0

S (q; )  P ID () q	 8 2 A: (9)
For each  2 , consumers of type  are meant to pick the two-part tari¤characterized 
P ID () ; ()

, where  ()  T () P ID ()Q (). For each  2 A, deneM () 
Q () and PAD ()  T () =Q ().
It remains to verify that the tuple (M;PAD) satises conditions 13 in Theorem
3 when  = 0. Clearly condition 1 in Theorem 3 holds.
Since consumers of type  has no incentive to deviate to pick the two-part tari¤
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for any type  2 A, we have
0 = U ()  max
q0
fS (q; )  P () q    ()g    () 8 2 A:
That is,  is nonnegative.
Pick any  2 A. By nonnegativity of ,
PAD () =
T ()
Q ()
=
P ID ()Q () +  ()
Q ()
 P ID () :
It, together with (9), implies
Q () 2 arg max
qQ()

S (q; )  PAD () q	 8 2 A:
That is, condition 2 in Theorem 3 holds.
Since (Q; T ) is IC, by Fact 1, Q is nondecreasing. HenceM is nondecreasing. Pick
any 1; 2 2 A with 1 < 2. Since consumers of type 2 has no incentive to deviate
to pick the two-part tari¤ for type 1, we have T (2)  P ID (1)Q (2) +  (1). It,
together with the monotonicity of Q and the nonnegativity of , implies that
PAD (2) =
T (2)
Q (2)
 P ID (1) +  (1)
Q (2)
 P ID (1) +  (1)
Q (1)
=
T (1)
Q (1)
= PAD (1) :
That is, PAD is nonincreasing. Therefore, condition 3 in Theorem 3 holds.
Proof of Theorem 5.
In the following we prove part (a). The proof of part (b) is similar to but easier
than the proof of part (a), and is omitted.
Suppose that  = ID1 . By Corollary 3, there exist some second best quantity
function Q and some nonincreasing function P  : f 2  : Q () > 0g ! R such
that
Q () 2 argmax
q0
fS (q; )  P  () qg (10)
wheneverQ () > 0. By Assumption 2, Q () is the unique solution ofmaxq0H (q; )
for all  2  except possibly  and . By Berge Maximum Theorem, Q is continuous
on n; 	.
Let
 
QADFn ; T
ADF
n

be an n-ADF-optimal outcome with a nite n. Apply Theorem
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3.
 
QADFn ; T
ADF
n

is associated with some ;A;M; P as described in Theorem 3. Since
M is nondecreasing, P is nonincreasing, and (M;P ) takes at most n values, we can
let
(M () ; P ()) =
8>><>>:
(m1; p1) if  2 1
...
...
(mn0 ; pn0) if  2 n0
where f1; : : : ;n0g is a partition of A, n0  n, each i (i = 1; : : : ; n0) is nonempty,
and
i < j whenever 1  i < j  n0 and i 2 i and j 2 j;
m1  m2      mn0 ;
p1  p2      pn0 :
Moreover, for  2 i,
QADFn () 2 argmax
qmi
fS (q; )  piqg : (11)
Claim 1: For every i = 1; : : : ; n0, exactly one of the following occurs: (I)
QADFn () > Q
 () for all  2 i; (II) QADFn () < Q () for all  2 i; (III) there
exists some i 2 i such that QADFn (i) = Q (i).
To prove Claim 1, suppose rst that both (I) and (II) are false. Then QADFn (1) >
Q (1) and QADFn (2) < Q
 (2) for some 1; 2 2 i. Notice that Q is continuous
(by Assumption 2) and nondecreasing, and QADFn is nondecreasing. If 1 < 2, then
there exists some i 2 (1; 2) such that QADFn (i) = Q (i). If 2 < 1, then
pi  P  (1) (otherwise QADFn (1)  Q (1), a contradiction), and pi  P  (2)
(otherwise QADFn (2)  Q (2), a contradiction), and P  (2)  P  (1) (because
P  is nonincreasing), and then P  () = pi on [2; 1], and then QADFn () = Q ()
for almost all  2 (2; 1) (otherwise QADFn is not n-ADF-optimal, a contradiction).
Therefore, Claim 1 is true.
For every i = 1; : : : ; n0, we take i  supi if case I in Claim 1 occurs, and take
i  inf i if case II in Claim 1 occurs, and take i such that QADFn (i) = Q (i) if
case III in Claim 1 occurs.
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Now we dene
P IDn () 
8>><>>:
P  (1) if  2 1
...
...
P  (n0) if  2 n0
:
Clearly, P IDn : A! R is nonincreasing because P  is.
We will construct an outcome
 
QIDn ; T
ID
n

such that
QIDn () = 0 for  2 nA;
QIDn () 2 argmax
q0
fS (q; )  P  (i) qg for  2 i; (12)
T IDn () = S
 
QIDn () ; 
  Z 

S
 
QIDn (x) ; x

dx for  2 :
By Theorem 2, any such
 
QIDn ; T
ID
n

is n-ID-implementable.
Notice that S
 
QIDn () ; 
  T IDn () = 0  S  QADFn () ;   TADFn (). In order
to apply Lemma 1, we will prove, for every i = 1; : : : ; n0, that inf i <  < i
implies QADFn ()  QIDn ()  Q (), and that i <  < supi implies QADFn () 
QIDn ()  Q ().
Pick any i = 1; : : : ; n0 and any  2 i. Suppose that case I in Claim 1 occurs.
Then   supi = i. If the constraint q  mi is not binding in problem (11)
for type i, then pi  P  (i)  P  (). Comparing (10), (11) and (12), we can
select QIDn () such that Q
ADF
n ()  QIDn ()  Q (). If the constraint q  mi is
binding in problem (11) for type i, then Q
ADF
n () = mi = Q
ADF
n (i)  Q (i).
Since P  (i)  P  (), comparing (10) and (11), we can select QIDn () such that
Q (i) = Q
ID
n (i)  QIDn ()  Q ().
Suppose that case II in Claim 1 occurs. Then   inf i = i. Then pi 
P  (i)  P  (). Comparing (10), (11) and (12), we can select QIDn () such that
QADFn ()  QIDn ()  Q ().
Suppose that case III in Claim 1 occurs and the constraint q  mi is not binding in
problem (11) for type i. Then pi = Sq
 
QADFn (i) ; i

= Sq (Q
 (i) ; i) = P
 (i).
For inf i <  < i, we have pi = P
 (i)  P  (), so that we can select QIDn ()
such that QADFn ()  QIDn ()  Q () whenever QADFn ()  Q (). If QADFn () <
Q (), then, for small " > 0 and x 2 (   "; ], we have QADFn (x) < Q (x) (since
Q is continuous and QADFn is nondecreasing) and pi = P
 (x), and then QADFn is not
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n-ADF-optimal because QADFn (x) can be reselected as Q
 (x) for all x 2 (   "; ] to
raise prot, a contradiction. For i <  < supi, we have pi = P
 (i)  P  (),
so that we can select QIDn () such that Q
ADF
n ()  QIDn ()  Q () whenever
QADFn ()  Q (). If QADFn () > Q (), then, for small " > 0 and x 2 [;  + "), we
have QADFn (x) > Q
 (x) (again since Q is continuous and QADFn is nondecreasing)
and pi = P  (x), and then QADFn is not n-ADF-optimal because Q
ADF
n (x) can be
reselected as Q (x) for all x 2 [;  + ") to raise prot, a contradiction.
Suppose that case III in Claim 1 occurs and the constraint q  mi is binding in
problem (11) for type i. Then pi  P  (i) and mi = QADFn (i) = Q (i). For
inf i <  < i, we have Q
ADF
n () = mi = Q
 (i). Since P
 (i)  P  (), we can
select QIDn () such that Q
 (i) = Q
ID
n (i)  QIDn ()  Q (). For i <  < supi,
we have pi  P  (i)  P  (), so that we can select QIDn () such that QADFn () 
QIDn ()  Q () whenever QADFn ()  Q (). Repeating our previous logic, one can
show that QADFn () > Q
 () is impossible.
Apply Lemma 1, we see that IDn  ADFn . If IDn = ADFn , then it must be the
case that
 
QADFn ; T
ADF
n

and
 
QIDn ; T
ID
n

make the same prot and
 
QIDn ; T
ID
n

is n-
ID-optimal. Then Lemma 1 implies that
 
QADFn () ; T
ADF
n ()

=
 
QIDn () ; T
ID
n ()

for almost all  2 . It completes the proof of part (a).
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